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Abstract
The UK government has recently introduced measures to intensify the internal migration 
control regime by improving coordination between immigration authorities and third-party 
enforcement agents. The following paper describes the internal migration control regime in the UK, 
focusing on measures developed to impede irregular migrants’ access to work, justice, healthcare, 
education and housing. It also explores the ways in which coordination between actors comprising the 
“immigration policing family” is hampered by administrative difficulties and, more fundamentally, by 
a lack of common goals. In response to these issues, successive UK governments have introduced 
sanctions for non-compliant enforcement agents, which are often discursively linked by immigration 
authorities to the notion of preventing third parties’ exploitation of irregular migrants. However, 
ultimately it is the developing internal control regime which threatens irregular migrants’ survival.
1. Introduction: Internal immigration control and the development of the “immigration policing 
family”
“Besides the Home Office, other bodies in the public and private sectors have a role to play in making 
it difficult for illegal migrants to remain in the country”1
“Frankly, it is too easy to be an illegal immigrant in Britain today”2
While the word “border” brings to mind the physical boundaries encompassing the nation-
state, there are points of control and surveillance at several points on the migratory journey 
(Guiraudon and Joppke, 2001; Broeders and Engbersen, 2007). Migration control in the UK  has, for 
instance, been pushed “outwards” to foreign consulates issuing visas in Mumbai, Cape Town and 
Pattaya; pre-boarding checks at international airports; and to interdiction efforts in EU boundary 
countries such as Soviet Republics and Turkey (Lahav, 1998). At the same time, controls have 
increasingly been shifted “inwards”, targeting foreigners who have already entered the national space. 
These internal controls work in two ways: first, by preventing migrants from gaining access to a job, 
service or home to which they are not entitled; second, by ensuring that irregular migrants (or those 
who are facilitating their stay) come to the attention of the authorities (Vogel, 2000). 
Internal immigration controls require enforcement by a diffuse and pluralised network of 
actors. On the one hand, there is the network of state organisations for whom immigration 
enforcement is a central or defining part of their purpose. In the UK, the UK Border Agency’s 
enforcement duties have recently been siphoned into the “Immigration Law Enforcement” unit within 
the Home Office.  On the other hand, successive UK governments have “deputised”3 third parties for 
immigration enforcement, such as trade unions, employers, landlords, school teachers, doctors, labour 
inspectors, police officers, universities and welfare services. These actors do not have immigration 
control as defining purpose, but have increasingly been brought into the control matrix. 
Over the past twenty years, the UK government has increasingly shifted its focus from external to 
internal controls. More recently, the Immigration Act 2014 promises to intensify the internal 
immigration control regime by fostering stronger coordination between the different actors charged 
with immigration enforcement tasks. However, coordination of what might be called the “immigration 
policing family”4 is often undermined by competition, conflict and a lack of common goals. Third 
parties may resist the task of immigration enforcement for ideological reasons. For instance, doctors’ 
duty of patient care may prevent them from alerting the immigration authorities where irregular 
immigration is suspected. Third parties to whom immigration control tasks have been delegated might 
also find a commercial advantage in not complying with enforcement requirements. One example 
would be the benefits that some employers derive from illegal foreign employment, such as paying 
lower wages (Karlson and Katz, 2003; Jones, Ram et al., 2006).
As a result, the intensification of internal immigration control is politically controversial. Given 
the fact that allegiance of third parties to immigration enforcement cannot be assumed, coordination 
between the different parties responsible for immigration control can often only be achieved through 
punitive measures. Although the general principle is for migration control to target irregular migrants 
themselves, at times is it the non-compliant third parties who become the objects of punishment 
(Broeders, 2009). As the following article explores, the introduction of third-party sanctions is often 
discussed by the government in terms of the desire to protect irregular immigrants from exploitation 
by “rogue landlords” or “exploitative employers”, as well as to safeguard the sanctity of the 
immigration admissions regime. On the other side, reluctant third parties also pay homage to 
immigrants’ welfare, as well as “British values”, such as freedom, privacy, compassion or fairness 
when they are attempting to resist the imposition of immigration duties. Thus, the battles of internal 
immigration control offer an interesting site for exploring the construction of British value systems, as 
well as the way in which representations of immigrants’ welfare are manipulated in political debate. 
The current contribution is structured in such a way as to highlight the key nodes where current 
internal immigration control plays out: access to work; access to justice; access to healthcare; access 
to education; and access to housing. While the following sections focus primarily on the complexity 
of coordinating different enforcement agents - and the politics around the imposition of internal 
control duties- the issue of control measures’ impacts on irregular migrants is discussed at the end of 
the article.
2. Nodes of control
a. Access to work
Enforcement against unauthorised foreign employment5 requires a system of control that 
permeates the national labour market. As such, the UK has controls when the job applicant 
approaches the employer, as well as workplace inspections. Immigration checks during the 
application stage are primarily carried out by employers – perhaps the most obvious group within the 
“immigration policing family” for whom non-compliance reaps financial rewards. Cooperation is 
“encouraged” through sanctions where employers do not carry out appropriate documentary checks 
on the right to work. At the time of introduction in 1996, sanctions were strongly resisted by 
employers’ associations, who resented the additional burden controls implied. They also argued that 
many employers would respond to the risk of prosecution by refusing to employ ethnic minorities.6 
The result of political dissent was a system which was weak in several respects, and which was the 
subject of significant reform attempts (Ryan, 2007). 
Since the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006, a dual system of sanctions has been 
in place in the UK, with “on the spot” civil penalties of up to £10,000 per worker intended for the vast 
majority of employers, who hire unauthorised immigrants “careless[ly]”7 and criminal sanctions 
reserved for employers who “knowingly” employ undocumented migrants. A statutory defence exists 
as long as employers have checked certain documents. The draft Immigration (Employment of Adults 
Subject to Immigration Control) (Maximum Penalty) (Amendment) Order 2014 contains provisions 
to increase the total penalty per worker to £20,000.
 The introduction of civil sanctions has facilitated the punishment of employers for the 
unauthorised employment of foreign nationals. However, a key issue with the current system is that it 
places verification of a potential employees’ right to work in the hands of non-experts: employers. 
Previously, employers had very little access to information that could help them make a decision as to 
the validity of the documents given to them by their employee. However, “biometric residence 
permits” (BRPs) introduced in 2008 for foreign nationals can be checked against a nationwide 
database through an online checking service (Warren and Mavroudi, 2011).  This new system 
represents a significant tightening of the enforcement regime, although it still depends upon 
employers’ cooperation and judgement and will not prevent foreign workers from presenting forged 
EU identity documents.
The other check at the application stage concerns the allocation of National Insurance 
numbers,  which is an “administrative indicator used by the Department of Work and Pensions and 
[Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs] to record Tax and National Insurance contributions and 
payments of benefits.”8 All job applicants must present their National Insurance numbers to their 
employers during the application stage. Notably, until 2005, the issuing body - the Department of 
Work and Pensions (DWP) - instructed Jobcentre staff to issue National Insurance numbers even 
when there was evidence that immigration status had been falsified. This was because “any 
prosecution action in respect of the falsified immigration documentation would be the responsibility 
of [the immigration and nationality directorate]9 – NOT THE [DEPARTMENT OF WORK AND 
PENSIONS].”10 
This remarkable instruction is an indication of the particular coordination problems that the 
UK “immigration policing family” faces.  Following media outcry, the enforcement regime has 
tightened considerably. Today, “all cases are checked for the right to work”11 before a National 
Insurance number is allocated. In addition, the Department of Work and Pensions are permitted12 to 
share information on illegal immigration with the UKBA, although they do not record how often this 
occurs and what particular information they have forwarded. It is therefore uncertain the extent to 
which discovery of irregular status by the DWP implies notification of the immigration authorities. 
Nonetheless, it has clearly become much harder for irregular migrants to gain access to 
National Insurance numbers in recent years. However, it is worth noting that National Insurance 
numbers are readily available on the black market – partially because they do not expire when right to 
leave or work runs out - and can be easily used by imposters, in part because they contain no 
biometric data (Düvell, 2008: 198). Thus, the control regime is not airtight.
In terms of the inspection regime, the Civil Penalty Compliance team – formerly part of the 
UK Border Agency - is responsible for checking that employers are fulfilling their duties at the gate of 
employment. The unit is not large – in 2011, only 41 members of staff worked on the Civil Penalty 
Compliance Team.13 Before conducting an inspection, inspectors are required to have a “reasonable 
suspicion” based on facts, information and/or intelligence - relevant to a specific workplace or to 
individual workers - that immigration laws have been or are being breached (Trade Union Congress, 
2010). Thus, the vast majority of workplace raids carried out by the team are in response to 
denunciations. Finally, the Civil Penalty Compliance team carried out 5,083 illegal working 
enforcement visits in 201114  – a decline from the 7,178 workplace visits conducted between April 
2007 and March 2008.15 Falling inspection figures indicate the team’s shrinking resources, which can 
be seen in the context of the current Conservative-Liberal government’s attempt to reduce the national 
budget through cutting public services.16  It is unclear what the impact of organisation restructuring 
(the abolishment of the UKBA after being designated “unfit for purpose” and the establishment of a 
new Immigration Law Enforcement division) will be on the UK’s workplace inspection regime.
The Civil Penalty Compliance team is also assisted in its work by other departments involved 
in the control of illegal work. Importantly, the UK has no general system of labour inspection. 
Instead, there are many different agencies concerned with different aspects of the shadow economy, 
including: the Department for Work and Pensions, which is primarily concerned with benefit fraud; 
the Gangmasters’ Licensing Authority, which concentrates on the supply of labour in agriculture, 
horticulture and the shellfish industry; the Health and Safety Inspectorate, which focuses on health 
and safety standards in the workplace, and so forth. The end result of this fragmented institutional 
environment is that informal employment means different things to different departments and labour 
inspectors do not have the same priorities as one another.  
Joint working is rare because of “the different priorities and objectives” of the agencies.17 For 
instance, according to Health and Safety Executive (HSE) guidance on joint working with the former 
UK Border Agency, “officers should not be distracted from their primary statutory function,”18 which 
is to enforce health and safety standards. Visiting HSE inspectors were warned that passing 
information to the UKBA could result in the rapid deportation of potential witnesses, turning on some 
occasions into “life or death” situations.19 Here, the contradictions of simultaneously enforcing 
immigration law and labour standards are considered in an explicit fashion.
A notable feature of the UK control regime is that cooperation with the immigration 
authorities varies from department to department. For instance, in the past 3 years, the Gangmasters’ 
Licensing Authority passed on information to the UKBA 285 times20 while the Health and Safety 
Executive only did so once.21 The difference between the two agencies can be explained by the fact 
that the Gangmasters’ Licensing Authority was founded in response to the deaths of a group of 
illegally resident Chinese cockle-pickers at Morecombe Bay. From the start, the task of immigration 
enforcement was a given part of the Authority’s remit. 
In recent years - and particularly since the damning judgments contained in the Treasury’s 
“Grabiner report” on Illegal working (2000)22 - there have been some efforts to improve inter-
departmental coordination.23 For instance, until 2012, Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC), 
which holds data on employment and tax contributions, explicitly rejected “bulk data matching” with 
the records collected by the UKBA, for fear of repercussions under the Data Protection Act (1998).24 
Fear of criminal prosecution for the wrongful disclosure of HMRC information (section 42 of the 
2007 Act) means that information sharing only occurred in the UK on a case-by-case basis. However, 
in the past year, the guidance has changed so that bulk data matching does occur, although records are 
not kept of its use. The legality of such measures regarding data protection issues has not been 
investigated. 
b. Access to justice
The role of the police immigration enforcement has changed dramatically over the years. In 
the 1970s, the police were primarily responsible for what little internal immigration enforcement took 
place during this period.25 Today, the police take a “key” if secondary role in immigration 
enforcement. Statistics are patchy, but it appears most police action on immigration is concentrated in 
London: in 2011-2012 the London Metropolitan police conducted 5,152 arrests for immigration, 
compared to 348 in Devon and 97 in Suffolk in 2011.26 A Home Office report on policing found a 
regular flow of arrestees picked up “purely on the basis of their immigration status”, as a result of 
either “lorry-stop drop-off” operations or joint immigration/police actions (Hamilton-Smith and Patel, 
2006).
 The former UK Border Agency and police occasionally worked together in “Crime 
Reduction Operations” (“CrOps”) where there was suspicion that immigration crime would be 
uncovered alongside other crimes. Nonetheless, the relationship between the police and the UKBA 
was relatively complicated. The first issue was competing objectives. The police resented the use of 
their resources – particularly, holding cells – for capturing illegal immigrants, as opposed to other, 
more prioritised crime control activities (Jordan, 2002). Secondly, the desire to maintain good 
community relations inhibited police cooperation with immigration authorities. In particular, the 
suffocation of Jamaican woman named Joy Gardner in the course of her arrest by immigration and 
police officers in 1993 was a central cause in the police’s reappraisal of its role in immigration 
enforcement (Gibney, 2008). The need for greater sensitivity around issues of nationality was 
magnified by the designation of the police as “institutionally racist” in their response to Stephen 
Lawrence’s racially motivated murder (Macpherson, 1999). More recently, joint UKBA-police force 
identity checks in London underground stations have invoked widespread public condemnation on the 
basis that they are discriminatory and contravene fundamental freedoms in Britain.27 
Thirdly, the two agencies have confronted serious information sharing issues. Despite 
technological advances,28 police are generally unschooled in the mechanisms of identifying irregular 
immigrants among the general arrest population. Furthermore, the police have expressed concern that 
information they do pass on does not get used, as epitomised in the discovery that the UKBA failed to 
use data collected on the Police National Computer for tracing failed asylum seekers, claiming it was 
“unreliable”.29 Keith Vaz MP, Chairman of the Home Affairs Select Committee, dismissed these 
allegations as “evidence of the UKBA’s incompetence”. In general, differences in data collection 
methods have hindered effective collaboration between the two agencies. 
Finally, the police are particularly loathe to denounce migrants who are victims of crime to 
the immigration authorities. Arguably, the legal vulnerability of irregular immigrants renders them 
disproportionately vulnerable to criminal victimisation. UK police generally do not ask the 
immigration status of a victim reporting a crime, as the duty to protect a victim – and more generally, 
the desire not to dis-incentivise victims from reporting crime - is considered to supercede the task of 
immigration enforcement.  However, irregular migration status can become apparent if the case goes 
to court. In the UK, there is no explicit prohibition against judges making a referral to the immigration 
authorities, although this is no duty to do so. 
Whether judges find out about illegal status is another matter entirely. A key factor to 
consider on this level is who might be penalised by the revelation of irregular status in the courtroom. 
For example, in the case of claims of irregular immigrants’ workplace exploitation, the prevailing 
doctrine of illegality states that where an employment contract is not legal, the rights that it contains 
are not enforceable. The implication is severe for irregular migrants, who are prevented by this 
measure from seeking redress in courts. However, given the severe repercussion for employers if it is 
found that they are knowingly hiring illegal migrants, sometimes a “cat and mouse” agreement exists 
between an employer and an irregular migrant that the latter’s status will not be revealed.30 This is one 
of the rare occasions where third party sanctions have an unwittingly positive effect on irregular 
migrants.
c. Access to healthcare
The right to health for undocumented migrants is outlined in various international and legally 
binding covenants to which the UK is a signatory.31 However, the meaning and scope of the right to 
health lacks clear definition (Hendriks and Toebes, 1998; Toebes, 1999; Pollard and Savulescu, 
2004). The lack of conceptual clarity plays itself out in the variegated access of irregular immigrants 
to healthcare in the UK. In particular, both eligibility for free healthcare and third party reporting 
requirements in the UK depend upon whether the service is included as primary healthcare (GPs, 
community services) or secondary healthcare (hospitals, trusts). 
Relatively strict rules are in place for secondary health care. The criterion for eligibility is 
“ordinary residence”, which has been defined in case law32 as both “lawful” and “settled” residence. 
As such, illegally resident persons are not eligible for free secondary healthcare, although patients 
requiring immediately necessary and urgent must be treated irrespective of their ability to pay.33 
Anytime someone registers for secondary health care, they are meant to provide evidence that they 
have lived legally in the UK for a certain length of time. However, a recent consultation paper 
produced by the Home Office suggested that these checks were applied inconsistently across the 
NHS.34 Under the Immigration Act 2014, the NHS will have new responsibilities to ensure that they 
are properly charging where appropriate, although the details of this have yet to be worked out. There 
is no, as yet, any suggestion to implement sanctions for doctors or NHS staff who do not abide by 
immigration regulations.
The rules for primary healthcare are far more flexible. Illegal residents are eligible for free 
primary healthcare on the basis of their General Practitioners’ approval. In turn, General Practitioners 
(GPs) are free to include someone into their lists, with or without documentary evidence of identity or 
migration status. GPs’ discretion to refuse irregular immigrants is limited by the fact that any person 
who requires ‘emergent or immediately necessary’ treatment must receive that treatment free of 
charge for a period of up to 14 days. Furthermore, a number of practices have been threatened with 
legal action where they have refused to accept irregular immigrants as patients.35 Finally, if doctors 
choose not to provide treatment, the Primary Care Trust was until recently responsible for finding a 
willing GP.36 With the NHS currently going through structural flux, the future of this arrangement is 
unclear.  
During the Immigration Bill’s consultation phase, the Conservative-Liberal government 
outlined plans to make irregular immigrants pay for primary health care. A key argument made here 
was that the system “ma[de] it difficult for hospitals to administer overseas visitor treatment charges 
because they struggle[d] to differentiate between GP-referred patients who [we]re chargeable, and 
those who [we]re not.”37 However, the government faced strong opposition to the introduction of 
eligibility requirements in primary healthcare from within the medical establishment, including the 
powerful British Medical Association, who “strongly oppose[d] any system where GPs were required 
to act as UK Border Force agents.”38 The counterproductive effect of checks were also discussed by 
Royal College of General Practitioners chair Clare Gerada, who said immigrants with highly-
infectious conditions could end up “wandering around for fear of being charged” or going to 
emergency units that were far more expensive to run than doctors’ surgeries.39 Here, the argument of 
efficiency comes to the fore. Finally, national AIDS Trust chief executive Deborah Jack said the 
changes would “undermine years of work” to encourage at-risk groups to access HIV testing and 
treatment.40
Notably, even at the proposal stage, there was no suggestion that GPs – or indeed, any doctor, 
medical or non-medical professional – would be bound to pass information to immigration authorities 
if they discovered illegal residence (Kmietowicz, 2004; Singer, 2004: 1904). Health professionals 
present themselves as strongly driven by the duty of care, which is seen as contradictory with 
immigration enforcement. With regard to their duty to confidentiality, regulations further stipulate 
that “while there is a public interest argument for reporting the patient’s immigration status”, the 
decision to report information must be weighed against “the medical needs of the patient and the 
wider public”.41  Obligations of medical confidentiality outlined in the NHS Constitution prohibit the 
disclosure to third parties of patient information by the NHS and/or by other medical practitioners. 
Still, it is not defined whether confidentiality is limited to medical information or to any information 
about the patient, which could include contact details and immigration status. Furthermore, case law 
has established that medical confidentiality can be overridden by “public interest”, albeit only under 
“very special circumstances”.42 
Still, there is some evidence of increased denunciation by the NHS to the immigration 
authorities. A memorandum of understanding declared that the NHS Protect – the operating name for 
the Counter Fraud and Security Management Service – would both “inform UKBA where any 
instances of suspected immigration offences [came] to light” and “respond to information requests”, 
subject to confidentiality agreements. Since 1 Jan 2012, the NHS Protect has passed information on to 
the former UKBA on 82 occasions.43 A lawyer interviewed for this study also mentioned that he had 
represented “several cases” where NHS professionals had passed on his clients’ information to the 
UKBA. In the end, clients became “too fearful” to proceed.44 Anecdotal evidence also suggests that 
the threat of denunciation is being used to deter irregular immigrant accessing healthcare. A Migrant 
Rights Network report presented a case study where an illegally resident pregnant woman was told 
that, “If you need treatment, you’ll have to pay for it privately or go to Urgent Care Centre or A&E, 
and your details will be passed to our Counter-Fraud team and the Home Office.”45 As the examples 
here emphasise, access to secondary healthcare does carry a small degree of risk of discovery for 
irregularly resident migrants – a fact that may operate as a sufficient deterrent to their use of health 
services.  Nonetheless, in a context of generally strong resistance to the mixing of clinical and 
immigration objectives, it would be difficult to fathom what sorts of policies would augur systematic 
cooperation between the two agencies. As such, it is likely that the implementation of new 
immigration duties for hospital staff under the Immigration Act 2014 will be problematic.
d. Access to education
Children’s right to education – irrespective of their immigration status - is a principle 
enshrined in international law. There are approximately 120,000 school aged children in the UK who 
are in the country illegally (Sigona and Hughes, 2012: vii). In the UK, all Local Education Authorities 
(LEAs) have a duty under Section 13 of the Education Act 1996 to provide a school place for every 
child aged 4 through 16 residing on a temporary or permanent basis in the catchment area. Irregularly 
resident children are entitled to attend publicly funded schools. In order to safeguard this right, there 
is no obligation for a UK education authority or school to request proof of a child’s immigration status 
or any duty of disclosure forcing schools to divulge information to the immigration authorities. 
Proposals to introduce school controls and disclosure requirements were met with particularly 
strong opposition.  In March 2013, a series of leaked emails from a government taskforce called the 
“Inter-ministerial group on migrants' access to benefits and public services” indicated that they were 
considering changing the rules around the role of schools in immigration enforcement.46 One email 
read: "barring children, whatever their migrant status, from compulsory education has pretty much 
been ruled out by ministers and at the moment is off the table…The question now is whether, if not to 
enforce a ban, it would nevertheless be helpful to carry out migrant status checks as part of school 
admissions.”47 
The teachers’ unions reacted swiftly and angrily to the suggestion that controls might be 
introduced. Lesley Gannon, National Association of Head teachers argued that children should not be 
held “responsible for the actions of their parents, it’s simply not fair.”48 Notably, Christine Blower of 
the National Union of Teachers compared the introduction of immigration enforcement in health and 
welfare: “We have heard politicians talk of immigrants as ‘health tourists’. This is unacceptable. The 
Government must not create conditions that imply that the children of immigrants are ‘education 
tourists’.”49 In both of these cases, the innocence of children is used to justify their particular 
exemption from immigration enforcement – a discourse which also underlies the recent ban on 
children in immigration removal centres (Anderson, 2012). The duty to protect the innocent clearly 
carried weight: while, as above, health checks have been introduced, the immigration ministry were 
quick to withdraw the aforementioned plans to introduce checks in schools. 
Still, the fact that schools and LEAs require proof of a pupil’s address is likely to pose 
significant difficulties to irregular migrants, who may not have such a thing as a permanent address 
(see section on housing) (Sigona and Hughes, 2012). Furthermore, the situation changes drastically 
once a child reaches the age of compulsory education at 16. In terms of further education (age 16-19), 
the Learner Eligibility Guidance (Young People’s Learning Agency and the Skills Funding Agency 
2010) states that a pupil must lawfully reside in the United Kingdom to obtain a free place.  However, 
there is no regulation stipulating that schools must pass information pertaining to students’ migration 
status.
Universities, by contrast, are more tightly interwoven into immigration enforcement. All 
prospective students from non-EU countries must have a Tier 4 student visa.50 In turn, the University 
must have a sponsorship license and fulfil several duties like contacting the immigration authorities 
when the student fails to enrol, misses ten expected contact sessions or more generally is suspected of 
breaking the conditions of stay. Between 2011-2012, a nation-wide campaign regarding the misuse of 
student visas and the proliferation of bogus colleges led to almost half of all educational institutions 
being struck off the approved Tier 4 sponsorship list.51 A high profile recent example was when 
London Metropolitan University lost its sponsorship licence for “a number of serious breaches of their 
sponsor duties.”52 The decision left 2,700 non-EU overseas students in limbo, with many of them 
facing a choice between transferring to another university or leaving the country.53
 Given the huge financial loss implied in losing sponsorship, universities are strongly 
compelled to abide by requirements. However, the lack of substantial public and civil backlash in 
these cases indicates that irregular immigrants’ access to university education is conceptualised 
differently to pre-16 education – namely, as a luxury rather than a right. While university staff may be 
somewhat reluctant to be co-opted into immigration enforcement, they do not do so from the 
perspective of human rights, but on the basis of the extra burden it implies, as well as the lack of 
clarity in guidance from the former UKBA.54  More generally, the University and College Union 
oppose the inclusion of overseas students in the immigration cap on the basis that it damages British 
universities’ “reputation for excellence” and “standing on the global stage.”55
e. Access to housing
Despite the tabloid media’s perception that irregular migrants take precedence over British 
nationals in housing queues,56 the former have minimal access to publically-funded housing. 
Furthermore, the application process for council housing is complex and requires substantial 
evidentiary proof. Thus, there is very little chance of an irregular immigrant gaining access to social 
housing through forgery or deception. Instead, they are compelled to find housing on the private 
rented sector.
The UK’s private housing market is relatively unregulated when compared to its European 
neighbours. Private landlords do not have to register themselves with the state unless they own large 
multiple-occupancy housing.57 They are not responsible for notifying the authorities when there is a 
new tenant. Furthermore, until recently, although many landlords and letting agents made checks on 
prospective tenants – for instance, asking to see evidence of identity, the tenant’s prior history of 
rental payments or seeking third party references – these were aimed at protecting the landlord’s 
assets and revenues, rather than statutory immigration measures. 
In the past couple of years, however, the private rental market has been subject to ever more 
intensive surveillance. Following protracted struggle, the Immigration Act 2014 has recently 
introduced requirements for landlords to conduct immigration checks on tenants, with financial 
penalties for those who provide rented accommodation to illegal non-EEA migrants unless they have 
carried out sufficient checks. If a landlord declines to provide accommodation to a prospective tenant 
because they cannot produce satisfactory documentation, there would be no legal duty on the landlord 
to report the person to the Home Office, although s/he is free to do so. 
The control regime is therefore similar to the system that is in place for employers. In addition 
– and much like the way in which employer sanctions are discussed -  the introduction of landlords 
controls are discursively tied to the desire to protect “[exploited] illegal migrants [who] in the worst 
cases…can end up living in overcrowded and poor housing conditions whilst  generating significant 
profits for unscrupulous landlords.”58 However, there is an obvious contradiction in approach, insofar 
as the “the primary objective of the policy is to make it more difficult for illegal migrants to gain 
access to privately rented accommodation” and “to encourage [them] to choose to leave the 
country”.59
The resident landlord’s association strongly opposed the landlord controls, using similar 
discourses to those by employer associations during the introduction of employer sanctions. First and 
foremost, they argued that controls would imply ‘unwanted ‘red tape’ and additional costs for 
landlords.  Second, they argued that the checks would be ineffective, given that they place the onus 
for enforcement on untrained staff and because illegal immigrants refused by one landlord would 
‘simply move on either to an ignorant landlord who does not check or an unscrupulous landlord who 
will take them on anyway’ (RLA, 2013: 9). Finally, they also criticised the proposals because of the 
risk of ‘unintended discrimination’ by landlords who are scared of penalties (ibid, p. 5). 
Given the profits that landlords have made from exploiting irregular immigrants, it is an open 
question as to whether the resident landlord association’s concern for the welfare of immigrants is 
heartfelt. However, the Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association also voiced opposition to the 
introduction of housing controls. Their major argument was that ‘people lawfully in the UK, including 
British citizens, cannot always produce identity documentation’ (ILPA, 2013: 2). This is not 
understood as a mere administrative technicality. Instead, they quoted the Home Secretary’s 
introduction to the second reading of the Identity Documents Bill, in which he argued that ‘We are a 
freedom-loving people… discomfort [towards ID cards is] born of a very healthy and British 
revulsion towards bossy, interfering, prying, wasteful and bullying Government’(ibid). In doing so, 
the ILPA framed their opposition in terms of the British character. 
3. Conclusion
As the article above has discussed, relationships between the different members of the 
“immigration policing family” are complex.60  The key issue is one of conflicting aims and objective. 
Each actor within the “immigration policing family” has his or her own set of priorities, which may 
supersede the duty of immigration enforcement or even, undermine it. For private enterprises – in this 
article, employers and landlords – the primary objective is to facilitate business. Irregular immigrants 
may be seen as favourable tenants or workers, precisely because of the structural vulnerability implied 
by their irregular immigration status. 
Competing objectives also beset the co-option of state actors. For instance, the police are 
primarily interested in crime control, doctors with healthcare; health and safety inspectors with 
working conditions; and teachers with education. As the examples described in the article emphasise, 
the government does not act with a single mind. Instead, it consists of innumerable agents and 
institutions struggling to reshape the contours of the state according to their own interests. The 
problem is that the government has a series of objectives, tunnelled into different departments – and at 
times, these policies come into conflict with each-other. Third parties’ resistance to deputisation 
reflects the continual renegotiation of a hierarchy of aims within the government itself. 
Reluctant third-parties actors use a variety of discourses to support their positions. In the UK, 
resistance is often couched in nationalistic terms. Political actors in the UK associate their opposition 
by paying homage to “British values” that supposedly carry greater weight than the duty of 
immigration enforcement. In particular, the British “love of freedom” and our supposed antagonism 
towards unwarranted state interference constitute an oft-visited discourse in the battle against 
immigration duties. 
A second set of discourses centre on the “unintended discrimination” that controls would visit 
on the legally resident immigrant or ethnic minority population. Such discourses – although not 
expressly linked to Britishness in recent debates – nonetheless offer a key insight into notions of 
belonging in the UK. In particular, by highlighting the damage that immigration controls would do to 
the ethnic minority population, third actors are paying homage to a long-held self-conception of a 
Britain which protects the rights of “people long established in this country”, 61 wherever they or their 
family are from originally. The desire to align oneself with this perspective is particularly strong 
amongst the police, who continue to struggle in their relationships with ethnic minority communities. 
At the same time, the introduction of biometric residence permits – while identity cards are resisted 
for British nationals - undermines the straightforward depiction of Britain as a place where the rights 
of all are equally respected. While British politicians pride themselves on resisting the introduction of 
identity cards for British nationals on the grounds of civil liberties and a deeply felt cultural allegiance 
to personal freedom,62 BRPs are rolled out across the foreign population. The fact that these 
considerations are not extended to foreign nationals undermines another facet of the national myth: 
the view of Britain as a multicultural haven. 
Third parties also consistently use notions of irregular migrants’ welfare to justify their 
opposition to immigration control. The relative success of certain groups (e.g. teachers) versus others 
(e.g. doctors) in appealing to public sympathy and ultimately, being able to deny immigration 
enforcement duties on this basis is indicative of a hierarchy of deservedness in the British context. In 
particular, the irregularly resident child at the school gate apparently carries greater political clout 
than the sick, but ineligible immigrant turning up at the hospital. A key difference between the two 
symbolic figures is their intention - the fact that the child is unable to make the decision to immigrate 
illegally justifies their claim to educational rights. In turn, such a conceptualisation implies that the 
intention of the person in question carries greater moral weight than the extent of their need. Whether 
or not this is justifiable is beyond the scope of the present article, but it remains that the relative 
success of the two groups of actors provides a key insight into construction of a public value system 
in Britain.
Other questions are raised in cases where both the former UK Border Agency and the third 
party claim that their policy positions are motivated by concern for irregular immigrants. Notably, the 
use of a “discourse of care” by the UKBA – that is, a claim that immigration enforcement is motivated 
by a desire to protect the exploited – only happens in the case of private third parties such as 
employers and landlords because it is easy to understand the commercial advantages that these actors 
gain from irregular immigration. It is difficult to resist scepticism when employers and landlords 
claim their resistance to immigration control duties comes from a place a concern for irregular 
immigrants’ welfare - not least because they tend to find ways of taking advantage even when 
controls are implemented. For instance, subsequent to the introduction of the civil penalty regime, 
campaigners for the Justice for Cleaners reported a number of incidents relating to employers’ use of 
document checks against unionised migrant cleaners, including threatening workers with dismissal if 
they took part in industrial action and suspending workers without pay until they submitted 
documents for re-checking. In these cases, employers found it convenient to ‘discover’ that the 
documents that they previously accepted were not genuine (Evans, 2008: 20).  In addition, employers 
appear to be offsetting the increased risk of detection by paying lower wages to irregular migrants 
(Scott, 2012). 
By contrast, it would be difficult to argue convincingly that humanitarian actors such as 
doctors, teachers, labour inspectorates, police officers and the Immigration Law Practitioners’ 
Association are primarily motivated by the desire to exploit irregular immigrants. In turn, 
humanitarian actors have so far avoided the sanctions which private third parties are confronting, 
although a worrying trend in this direction is the prosecution of “humanitarian smugglers” under the 
offence of assisting unlawful immigration (Aliverti, 2013: 49). It remains to be seen whether 
punishments will creep across to these members of the “immigration policing family” too.
Despite the smokescreen of concern, immigration authorities’ foremost aim is unavoidably 
clear. The introduction of internal controls is primarily motivated by the desire to deter irregular 
immigration through making it difficult to live on national territory - although the extent to which this 
policy objective will actually be realised remains uncertain. In particular, “policy implementation in 
the end comes down to the people who actually implement it” (Lipsky, 1980: 8) - and as above, the 
consensus of implementing actors is clearly not a given. At the same time, the fear of deportation is so 
strong that even a small chance of discovery deters many irregular immigrants from making contact 
with any type of authority. 
Even if controls do prevent irregular migrants accessing jobs, housing, and education, it does 
not necessarily follow that this will either deter future immigrants from coming to the country - or 
encourage irregular immigrants to leave the country. Many will stay here regardless. Instead, the 
likely outcome for at least part of this population is widespread destitution, as well as increased 
recourse to informal and illegitimate social structures as irregular immigrants are pushed 
“underground” (Engbersen and Broeders, 2009). Given the fundamental, intractable contradictions 
between immigration enforcement and immigrants’ welfare, the utmost scepticism is therefore 
reserved for the muddy discourses of the UK Border Agency and any future attempt by immigration 
authorities to feign care for those they deport.
Bibliography
Aliverti, A. (2011) Making home safe? The role of criminal law and punishment in British 
immigration controls, Oxford University: Oxford
Aliverti, A. (2013) Crimes of Mobility: Criminal Law and the Regulation of Immigration, 
Routledge: Abingdon
Anderson, B. (2012) "Where’s the Harm in That? Immigration Enforcement, Trafficking, and 
the Protection of Migrants’ Rights", American Behavioral Scientist 56(9): 1241-1257.
Broeders, D. (2009) Breaking down anonymity: digital surveillane of irregular migrants in 
Germany and the Netherlands, Amsterdam University Press: Amsterdam
Broeders, D. and G. Engbersen (2007) "The Fight Against Illegal Migration: Identification 
Policies and Immigrants' Counterstrategies", American Behavioral Scientist 50(12): 1592-
1609.
Düvell, F. (2008) Report from the UK in  J. J. Doomernik, M. (eds.), Modes of migration 
regulation and control in Europe Amsterdam University Press: Amsterdam
Engbersen, G. and D. Broeders (2009) "The State versus the Alien: Immigration Control and 
Strategies of Irregular Immigrants", West European Politics 32(5): 867-885.
Evans, Y. (2008) "Papers Please" The Impact of the Civil Penalty Scheme on the 
Employment Rights of Migrants in the UK, Migrants' Rights Network. London
Finch, N. (2011) "The rights of irregular migrant children: legal opinion", unpublished.
Gibney, M. (2008) "Asylum and the Expansion of Deportation in the United Kingdom1", 
Government and Opposition 43(2): 146-167.
Guiraudon, V. and C. Joppke (2001) Controlling a new migration world, Routledge: London
Hamilton-Smith, N. and S. Patel (2006) Determining identity and nationality in local policing, 
Home Office Research Report 42. 
Hendriks, A. and B. Toebes (1998) "Towards a universal definition of the right to health?", 
Medicine and law 17(3): 319.
ILPA (2013) ILPA Information Sheet, ‘Tackling  illegal immigration in privately rented 
accommodation’: Home Office Consultation, Immigration Law Practioners' Association. 
London
Jones, T., M. Ram, et al. (2006) "Ethnic minority business and the employment of illegal 
immigrants", Entrepreneurship & regional development 18(2): 133-150.
Jordan, B., Düvell, F. (2002) Irregular migration : the dilemmas of transnational mobility, 
Edward Elgar: Cheltenham
Karlson, S. H. and E. Katz (2003) "A positive theory of immigration amnesties", Economics 
Letters 78(2): 231-239.
Kmietowicz, Z. (2004) "GPs to check on patients' residency status to stop “health tourism”", 
BMJ: British Medical Journal 328(7450): 1217.
Kupiszewski, M. M., H. (2008) Addressing the irregular employment of immigration in the 
European Union: Between sanctions and rights, IOM. 
Lahav, G. (1998) "Immigration and the state: The devolution and privatisation of immigration 
control in the EU", Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 24(4): 675 - 694.
Lipsky, M. (1980) Street-level bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the individual in public services, 
Russell Sage Foundation: New York
Macpherson, W. (1999) The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry, Presented to Parliament by the 
Secretary of State for the Home Department by Command of Her Majesty. 
Pollard, A. J. and J. Savulescu (2004) "Ethics in practice: Eligibility of overseas visitors and 
people of uncertain residential status for NHS treatment", BMJ: British Medical Journal 
329(7461): 346.
RLA (2013) Tackling illegal immigration in privately rented accommodation. The RLA’s 
response to the Home Office’s consultation on immigration checks for tenants, Resident 
Landlords' Associatio. Manchester
Ryan, B. (2007) Revisiting Employer Sanctions in the United States and Europe, Institute for 
the Study of International Migration,  Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown 
University. 
Scott, P. (2004) Undocumented Migrants In Germany And Britain: The Human Rights And 
Wrongs Regarding Access to Health Care. Electronic Journal of Sociology  
Scott, S., Craig, G., Geddes, A. (2012) Experiences of forced labour in the UK food industry, 
Joseph Rowntree Foundation. 
Sigona, N. and V. Hughes (2012) No way in, no way out, Irregular migrant children and 
families in the UK, COMPAS. Oxford
Singer, R. (2004) "Asylum seekers: an ethical response to their plight", The Lancet 
363(9424): 1904.
Toebes, B. (1999) "Towards an improved understanding of the international human right to 
health", Human Rights Quarterly 21(3): 661-679.
Trade Union Congress (2010) Immigration Document Checks and Workplace Raids, a 
negotiators’ guide, TUC. 
Vogel, D. (2000) "Migration Control in Germany and the United States", International 
Migration Review 34(2): 390-422.
Warren, A. and E. Mavroudi (2011) "Managing Surveillance? The Impact of Biometric 
Residence Permits on UK Migrants", Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 37(9): 1495-
1511.
1
 “Tackling illegal immigration in privately rented accommodation, consultation document”,  Home Office, 3 July 2013, 
accessible at: http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/documents/policyandlaw/consultations/33-
landlords/consultation.pdf?view=Binary p.10
2 ‘David Cameron’s immigration speech’ [online] 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/david-camerons-immigration-speech. 
3
 To use a term found in Lahav (1998)
4
 The concept of a “policing family” is borrowed from Crawford, A. & Lister, S. (2004) “The extended policing family: 
Visible patrols in residential areas” (published by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation). In both the original and the present 
article, it refers to the “reasonably well established mixed economy” (Crawford and Lister 2004: viii) of institutions 
performing policing tasks. 
5 Unauthorised foreign employment includes the employment of foreigners without the right of residence; foreigners with 
the right of residence and without the right to work; and finally, foreigners with the right of residence and right to work, but 
who are employed in a manner that contravenes the conditions of their immigration status (see (Kupiszewski, 2008)) The 
current article primarily focuses on foreigners without the right of residence.
6 “Businessmen bid to block bill. Immigration Scheme angers Employers. Anger at Immigration Scheme”, Herald Scotland, 
25 October 1995, accessible at: http://www.heraldscotland.com/sport/spl/aberdeen/businessmen-bid-to-block-bill-
immigrant-scheme-angers-employers-anger-at-immigrant-scheme-1.654879
7 Carelessly here implies employers who have hired foreign workers without undertaking a proper check of their documents 
and entitlement to work. This offence is used where intention of criminal wrongdoing cannot be proved (Aliverti, 2011)
8 Freedom of Information Request 3697, Department of Work and Pensions.
9
 The Immigration and Nationality Directorate is the organisation preceding the UK Border Agency, which has now been 
subsumed into the “Immigration Law Enforcement” unit within the Home Office.
10
 See “Immigration Control: Fifth Report of Session 2005-06, Volume 1” By Great Britain: Parliament: House of 
Commons: Home Affairs Committee p.112
11
 Freedom of Information Request 3697, Department of Work and Pensions
12
 Under Section 122B of the Social Security Administration Act (SSAA) 1992
13
 Freedom of Information request, 24287, UK Border Agency 
14
 Freedom of Information request, 24287, UK Border Agency
15Parliamentary debates, “Illegal Immigrants: Employment”, 11 February 2009: Column 2045w, accessible at: 
www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmhansrd/cm090211/text/90211w0016.htm
16
“Thousands of jobs under threat UK Border Agency” , Public and Commercial Services Union, 9 Jule 2010, accessible at: 
http://www.pcs.org.uk/en/news_and_events/news_centre/index.cfm/id/11D4FD0C-99D9-42DF-94514665E681BE3E
17
 Freedom of Information request 13-1133, Employment Agency Standards Inspectorate
18
“Topic Inspection Pack: Migrant Working”, Health and Safety Executive, revised March 2010, p.51 accessible at: 
http://www.hse.gov.uk/foi/internalops/fod/inspect/migrantworker.pdf 
19
 Joint Workplace Protocol for  sharing information between the HSE and  other Government departments and agencies, 
accessible at: http://www.hse.gov.uk/foi/internalops/ocs/001-099/84_6/index.htm
20
 Freedom of Information request, PF/AW
21
 Freedom of Information request, 2013080368
22
 “The Grabiner Report”, HM Treasury, accessible at: http//archive.treasury.gov.uk/pdf/2000/grabiner.pdf
23
 This included a tiny pilot project of joint shadow economy teams, which concluded 2006, see 
www.eurofound.europa.eu/areas/labourmarket/tackling/cases/uk004.htm
24
 http//hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/idgmanual/IDG55120.html, last accessed 25.10.2012, no longer available
25Deportation, HC Deb 23 March 1977 vol 928 cc540-1W, accessible at 
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/written_answers/1977/mar/23/deportation#S5CV0928P0_19770323_CWA_31
26
 Freedom of Information requests: London (FOI 2012080002362);  Devon (FOI 002731/12); Suffolk (FOI 597/11/12.)
27




 The UKBA set up a hotline for police officers. There is also an option for searching UKBA records when carrying out 
fingerprint scans through LiveScan. Finally, since the roll out of the Police National Database in 2010, police can scan 
identity documents as well. See (Hamilton-Smith and Patel, 2006)
29
“UKBA “ignored”  police data on  missing asylum seekers”, BBC, 26 June 2013, accessible here:  
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-23056052
30
 Former legal aid solicitor, interviewed in the course of doctoral research, 03.06.2012
31
 See the International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966 (entry into force January 3rd , 1976), 
which does not make distinctions between legal and “illegal” foreigners; and the International Convention on the Protection 
of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, December 18th 1990, particularly Art. 28 (as 
discussed in (Scott, 2004)accessible at: http://www.sociology.org/content/2004/tier2/scott.html 
32
 R v Barnet LBC Ex p Shah (Nilish) 1983 2AC 309 HL
33 Notable exemptions to this rule are “immediately necessary” treatments, which must be 
provided in advance of payment, and public health services, which include treatment for 
tuberculosis and sexually transmitted diseases, excluding HIV (Pollard and Savulescu, 
2004).  
34
“Controlling Immigration  - Regulating Migrant Access to Health Services in the  UK, consultation document”, Home 
Office, Consultation document, 3 July 2013, accessible at: 
http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/documents/policyandlaw/consultations/34-healthcare/consultation-
health.pdf?view=Binary
35See: “GPs forced to register illegal immigrants after threat of legal action”, Pulse, 22/12/2011, accessible at: 
http://www.pulsetoday.co.uk/gps-forced-to-register-illegal-immigrants-after-threat-of-legal-action/13234713.article
36
 Under section 83 of the NHS Act 2006
37
 Supra note 36, p.22
38
 Dr Laurence Buckman, chair of the British Medical Association's GP Committee, quoted here: http://bma.org.uk/news-
views-analysis/news/2013/july/overseas-nhs-visitor-charges-require-more-thought-warn-doctors-leaders
39
 ‘Don’t turn GP surgery into a border agency”, BBC , 03/07/2013, accessible at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-
23160057
40
 “Foreigner face more charges to access the NHS”, BBC, 03/07/2013, accessible at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-
23156403
41
“Implementing the Overseas Visitors Hospital Charging Regulations. Guidance for NHS Trusts in England”, Department 
of Health, April 2004, p.40
42
 W v Edgell [1990] 1 ALL ER 835
43
 FOI 2013.08.001. It has also received information 30 times in same time period.
44
 Immigration lawyer, interviewed in the course of doctoral research 24.06.2012
45
 “Access to Health Care is a right worth defending”, Migrant Rights Network, January 2011, accessible at: 
www.migrantsrights.org.uk/files/Access-to-Health-Care.pdf
46
“Ministers planning immigration crackdown on “education tourists””, The Guardian, 27 March 2013, accessible at: 
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/mar/27/ministers-immigration-crackdown-education-tourists
47
 Reported in “Ministers planning immigration crackdown on ‘education tourists’”, Shiv Malik and Peter Walker, The 
Guardian, 27 March 2013, accessible at: http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/mar/27/ministers-immigration-
crackdown-education-tourists
48
 Supra note 48
49
 “Immigration – press release”, Christine Blower, General Secretary of the National Union of Teachers, accessible at: 
http://www.teachers.org.uk/node/17936
50
 Note that irregular migrant children raised in the UK do not qualify as a Tier 4 (General) Student Migrant, see (Finch, 
2011)
51
 “Bogus college check catches 124”, BBC News, 8 January 2008, accessible at:  
http//news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/education/7177033.stm
52
“London Metropolitan University’s licence revoked”, Department for Business, Skills and Innovation, 30/08/2012, 
accessible at: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/london-metropolitan-universitys-licence-revoked
53
 “British visa ruling leaves thousands in limbo”, International Herald Tribune, 03 September 2012
54
“Final  Report: Cost and benefit analysis project on  immigration regulation” , Higher Education Better Regulation Group, 




 “Overseas students say immigration cap makes them feel less welcome in UK”, Universities and Colleges Union, 
24/06/2013, accessible at http://www.ucu.org.uk/6683
56See “Illegal immigrant mum gets four-bedroom house”, The Sun, 25/05/2010, for a classic example (accessible at: 
http://www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage/news/2867802/Illegal-immigrant-mum-gets-four-bedroom-house.html )
57




 Ibid, p. 7
60 The problem is partially one of miscommunication. The UK Border Agency was, at its 
closure, beginning to build up the technical infrastructure and administrative pathways to support the 
flow of information between agencies, although the extent to which these possibilities were used is 
another story entirely. In particular, the repeated failings of the UKBA did little satisfy other key 
agencies that cooperation was worthwhile. 
61
 See, for instance, “Immigration and Race Relations”, HC Deb 06 December 1973 vol 865 cc1546-82, accessible at: 
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1973/dec/06/immigration-and-race-relations-1
62
  ‘Laying ID cards to rest demonstrates the government’s commitment to scale back the power of the state and restore civil 
liberties…This is just the first step in the process of restoring and maintaining our freedoms.’ Home Office Minister Damian 
Green, see https://www.gov.uk/government/news/national-identity-register-destroyed-as-government-consigns-id-card-
scheme-to-history
